

Abengoa defines risk as any potential event that may prevent the company from reaching its business objectives. Abengoa considers that a risk arises as a loss of opportunities and/or strengths or the materialization of a threat and/or strengthening of a weakness.

IV. i) The Universal Risk Model

Abengoa's Universal Risk Model is made up of four categories, twenty subcategories and a total of 94 principal risks for the business. Each one of these risks has an associated series of indicators that allow its probability and impact to be measured and the degree of tolerance of the risk to be defined.

For each risk, at least one probability indicator and an impact indicator have been established. These may be quantitative and/or semi-quantitative indicators, while, at the same time, they allow tolerance levels to be fixed for subsequent evaluation and monitoring.

E - General Shareholders' Meeting

E.1 Indicate and, where applicable, provide details of whether there are any differences between the required quorum for the General Shareholders' Meeting and the quorum system set forth in the Spanish Public Limited Companies Act (Ley de Sociedades Anónimas, hereinafter LSA).

No

% of quorum different from that established in art. 102 of the LSA for general matters	% of quorum different from that established in art. 103 of the LSA for special matters
n/a	n/a

E.2 Indicate and, where applicable, provide details of any differences with the system contemplated in the LSA for the adoption of corporate resolutions.

No

Describe how it is different from the system envisaged by the LSA.

Not applicable

E.3 List any rights held by shareholders in relation to the general meetings insofar as these are different to those established in the LSA.

The right to information, in accordance with applicable regulations; the right to receive, free of charge, the documents related to the General Shareholders' Meeting; voting rights in proportion to their shareholding, subject to no maximum limit; the right of attendance for all shareholders that hold at least 1,500 shares; financial rights (to dividends, where applicable, and to the distribution of corporate assets); the right to be represented, to delegate votes, to pool shares and to pursue any legal causes of action to which the shareholder may be entitled.

E.4 Indicate, if applicable, any measures adopted to encourage participation by shareholders at general meetings.

The documents related to the meeting are sent to shareholders free of charge and are also published on the website at the time the meeting is convened. Votes may be delegated or cast remotely by filling out attendance cards in due time and form.

The Bylaws do not limit the maximum number of votes of a single shareholder and do not contain restrictions that make it difficult to assume control through the acquisition of company shares.

Proposed resolutions to be presented at the general meeting are published when the meeting is convened and are likewise included on the company's website and on that of the CNMV.

Items on the agenda deemed substantially independent are voted on separately at the General Shareholders' Meeting, such that shareholders can exercise their voting preferences separately, particularly in cases of appointments or ratifications of directors and amendments to the Bylaws.

The company allows for the splitting of votes so that financial intermediaries authorized to act as shareholders but who act on behalf of different clients can cast their votes in accordance with the individualized instructions of each client.

Each financial year, presentations are offered to investors, analysts and to the general market, which are previously notified to the Spanish Securities and Exchange Commission and which are published on the Company's web page.

In compliance with article 528.2 of the Corporations Act, Abengoa approved the Regulations for the Electronic Shareholders' Forum to facilitate communication between shareholders in connection with the convening and holding of each Shareholder's General Assembly. Shareholders may send the following prior to each General Assembly:

- Proposals they wish to include as part of the agenda outlined in the General Assembly convocation.
- Requests for adherence to said proposals.
- Initiatives for acquiring the sufficient percentage for the exercise of a minority voting rights.
- Requests for voluntary representation.

E.5 Indicate whether the Chairman of the General Shareholders' Meeting coincides with the position of Chairman of the Board of Directors. Give details, where applicable, of any measures that may have been adopted in order to guarantee the independence and correct functioning of the General Meeting:

Outline of the measures

The Bylaws stipulate that the office of Chairman of the General Meeting must be held by the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors, as decided by the Board itself. In accordance with this, General Shareholders' Meetings are presided over by the Chairman of the Board of Directors.

The Regulations of the General Shareholders' Meeting, as approved at the General Meeting held on June 29, 2003, contain procedures regulating the convening, functioning, exercise of

rights and adoption of resolutions at general meetings, thereby establishing an accurate and binding framework for the staging of such meetings.

The General Shareholders' Meeting is generally attended by a notary public, who verifies fulfillment of the requirements necessary for its valid constitution and the adoption of resolutions, and who issues the corresponding minutes.

It is the responsibility of the Secretary to the Board (who, in accordance with the Bylaws and the Regulations of the General Shareholders' Meeting, acts as the secretary at the general meeting) to ensure compliance with legal requirements and those stipulated in the Bylaws concerning the convening and staging of the meeting and the adoption of resolutions at the meeting.

E.6 Indicate, if applicable, any changes made during the financial year to the Regulations of the General Shareholders' Meeting.

No changes occurred.

E.7 Give details of attendance at general meetings held during the financial year to which this report refers.

Attendance Details

Date of General Meeting	% attendance in person	% as proxy	% remote voting	Electronic vote	Others	Total
11-4-2010	57.795%	8.217%	0	0	0.000%	66.013%

E.8 Briefly indicate the resolutions adopted at the General Shareholders' Meetings held in the financial year to which this report refers and the percentage of votes with which each resolution was adopted.

Abengoa's Ordinary General Assembly of Shareholders was held on 11th April 2010 and in attendance was a total of 59,725,210 shares, about 66.016% of the total equity, amounting to 407 shareholders (60 present and 347 represented) out of a total of 11,338 registered shareholders.

The decisions reached, all with the entire equity capital present and represented voting in favour, were as follows:

First Decision. Approval of the following:

1º. The Financial Statement (including the Balance, Profit and Loss Accounts and Report) and the Abengoa SA Management Report for the 2009 financial year;

2º. The Consolidated Financial Statement of the Group (including the Consolidated Balance, Profit and Loss Accounts and Report) and the Consolidated Management Report for the 2009 financial year;

3º. The Board of Directors management report for said financial year and the remuneration of its members, as stated in the Financial Statement.

Second Decision.

1º. The following 2009 financial year outcome distribution scheme is hereby approved, with the dividends to be distributed from 6th July 2010 onwards:

	Euros
Profit and Loss Account Balance	48,988,795.40
Application:	
To Voluntary Reserves	31,799,556.20
To Dividend	17,189,239.20
Total	48,988,795.40

2º. Mr. Felipe Benjumea Llorente, Mr. José B. Terceiro and the Secretary of the Board of Directors, Mr. Miguel Ángel Jiménez-Velasco Mazarío are hereby empowered such that either of them may register and deposit the Company's and the Consolidated Group's Financial Statement and Management Report at the Company Registry in accordance with the stipulations of the Law, marking them with signatures and by indicating their destination.

Third Decision: Ratification, appointment and, as the case may be, re-election of administrators.

- a) On the proposal of the Appointments and Remunerations Committee, Ms. Mercedes Gracia Díez is hereby re-elected as independent Board Member for another period of four years, following the expiration of the mandate conferred upon her by the 2006 General Assembly of Shareholders.
- b) On the proposal of the Appointments and Remunerations Committee, the co-optation appointment of Mr. José Borrell Fontelles, as an independent member, to serve a four-year term, is hereby ratified.

Fourth Decision: Re-election or appointment of the Company's or Consolidated Group's Accounts Auditor for the 2010 financial year.

Pursuant to article 204 of TR of the LSA, the Auditor of the Company and its group of companies, Pricewaterhouse Coopers SL, holder of Tax ID B-79031290, domiciled in Madrid, at Paseo de la Castellana, 43, entered in the Company Registry of Madrid, Volume 9,267, on page 8,054, sheet number 87,250, and in the Official Registry Of Auditors with number 50-242, is hereby appointed for a one-year term, for the ongoing 2010 financial year.

Fifth Decision: The special report on the Administrators' Remuneration Policy and the report on article 116 bis of the Stock Exchange Laws are hereby approved.

Sixth Decision: General assembly authorizations granted the Board of Directors.

In accordance with article 153-1-b) of the Consolidated Text of the Law governing Limited Liability Companies, the faculty of the Board of Directors, granted by the Ordinary General Assembly of Shareholders on 6th April 2008, to increase the equity capital, once or several times, up to eleven million three hundred eight thousand seven hundred ten Euros (€11,308,710) equal to fifty percent (50%) of the equity capital at the time of this authorization, through monetary contributions, with or without issuance bonus, in the amount and whenever the Board itself may deem necessary and without having to first consult the General Assembly, is hereby ratified. Likewise, in accordance with article 159, section 2 of the Consolidated Text of the Law governing Limited Liability Companies, the Board of Directors' are authorized to decide whether or not to exclude, as the case may be, pre-emptive subscription rights in relation to the increases that may be decided upon by virtue of this decision, if the circumstances envisaged in section 1 of the aforementioned article, relating to equities, concur, and as long as, if excluded, the nominal value of the

shares to be issued plus, as the case may be, the amount of the issuance bonus is equal to the actual value of the company's auditors' report prepared, on the request of the Board of Directors, for that purpose. The Board of Directors is also authorized to re-draft article 6 of the Corporate Bylaws, relating to equity capital, upon the execution of the increase, on the basis of the actual amounts subscribed and disbursed.

Regarding the shares that may be issued pursuant to the abovementioned decisions, the Board of Directors is authorized to apply to the CNMV, the Stock Exchange Governing Body, through any Brokerage House or Company, and to process applications for the aforementioned shares to be admitted to trade on any Stock Exchange Market, whenever the Board of Directors may deem opportune, fulfilling whatsoever requirements that may be set forth in the valid laws.

In accordance with article 27 of the Official Stock Exchange Regulations, the declarations of the shareholders regarding this decision shall be entered in the minutes.

Seventh Decision: General assembly authorizations granted the Board of Directors.

Pursuant to article 319 of the Company Registry Regulation and the general rules of issuance of bonds or debentures, for a period of five (5) years, with the specific faculty of substitution upon any of its members, the company's Board of Directors are authorized to issue any fixed income securities or debt securities of analogous nature (including, but not limited to, certificates, promissory notes or warrants), and fixed income or other types of securities (including warrants) convertible to the Company's shares and/or exchangeable for the Company's shares or for those of other companies within or outside the Company's group, for up to Five Thousand Million Euros (€5,000M), on one or several occasions. The Board of Directors are authorized, with the specific faculty of substitution upon any of its members, to set forth the criteria for determining the bases and modalities to convert, exchange or exercise the faculty to increase the equity capital in the amount necessary to meet the corresponding requests for conversion or exercise, and it is granted the faculty to exclude shareholders' pre-emptive subscription rights, in accordance with article 293.3 of the LSA and all other applicable rules and regulations.

Eighth Decision: General assembly authorizations granted the Board of Directors.

The Board of Directors is authorized to execute share buybacks of the company's own shares whether directly or through subsidiaries or companies in which shares are held up to the maximum envisaged in the current provisions at a price ranging from six Euros (€6) minimum to sixty Euros (€60) maximum per share. Said authorization is valid for eighteen (18) months counting from date granted, and shall remain subject to the Fourth Section of Chapter IV of the Consolidated Text of the LSA.

To ensure the above, the authorization conferred upon the Board of Directors for the same purposes, by virtue of decision taken at the Shareholders' Ordinary General Assembly meeting held on 5th April 2009, is hereby specifically revoked.

Ninth Decision: Empowerment of the Board of Directors.

Mr. Felipe Benjumea Llorente, Mr. José B. Terceiro, and Mr. Miguel Ángel Jiménez-Velasco Mazarío are hereby specifically authorized, such that any of them may, acting as special representative of this Assembly, appear before a Notary Public, to execute the necessary and due notarizations, as the case may be, to enter the decisions taken into the Company Registry as legally required, undersigning as many documents as may be necessary in the execution of said decisions.

The Board of Directors is also authorized, with the faculty of substitution, to freely interpret, apply, execute and develop the approved decisions, including rectification and fulfillment thereof, and to authorize any of its members to notarize any rectification or complementary deemed necessary to correct any error, defect or omission that could impede the entry of any decision whatsoever into the company registry, to the extent of complying with as many requirements as may be inevitable for the effectiveness of the decisions taken.

E.9 Indicate whether there are any restrictions in the Bylaws establishing a minimum number of shares needed to attend the General Shareholders' Meeting.

Number of shares needed to attend the General Shareholders' meeting 1,500, without detriment to all the shareholders' right to delegate, represent or gather shares.

E. 10 Indicate and explain the policies followed by the company with regard to the granting of proxies at General Shareholders' Meetings.

There are no specific policies, to the extent that there is no restriction on the exercise of the right to vote.

The only requirement is that the proxy be granted to another shareholder.

E.11 Indicate whether the company is aware of the policy of institutional investors regarding their participation in the decision-making process of the company.

No

E.12 Indicate the address and means of accessing corporate governance content on the company's website.

The Webpage of the Company, at www.abengoa.com, is regularly updated in both Spanish and English.

Said Webpage contains all the decisions taken at the last General Assembly meeting held on 11th April 2010. It also includes the complete convocation, the agenda and the decisions proposed for the Assembly to approve.

For convening subsequent assemblies, the Company will continue to update the available information to enable shareholders to exercise the right to information, and with it that to vote, under equal conditions.

Finally, with the established techniques and regulations determined, and with the safeguard of the legal security required, the rights to vote or to delegate via the Internet shall be guaranteed.

F - Degree to which corporate governance recommendations are followed

Indicate the degree to which the company follows the recommendations of the Unified Good Governance Code. If any of them are not complied with, explain the recommendations, regulations, practices or criteria that the company applies.

1. The bylaws of listed companies should not place an upper limit on the votes that can be cast by a single shareholder, or impose other obstacles to the takeover of the company by means of share purchases on the market.

See sections: A.9, B.1.22, B.1.23, E.1 and E.2

Compliant

2. When a dominant and a subsidiary company are stock market listed, the two should provide detailed disclosure on:

- a) The type of activity they engage in, and any business dealings between them, as well as between the subsidiary and other group companies;
- b) The mechanisms in place to resolve possible conflicts of interest.

See sections: C.4 and C.7

Compliant

3. Even when not expressly required under company commercial law, any decisions involving a fundamental corporate change should be submitted to the general shareholders' meeting for approval or ratification. In particular:

- a) The transformation of listed companies into holding companies through the process of subsidiarisation, i.e. reallocating core activities to subsidiaries that were previously carried out by the originating firm, even though the latter retains full control of the former;
- b) Any acquisition or disposal of key operating assets that would effectively alter the company's corporate purpose;
- c) Operations that effectively add up to the company's liquidation.

Partially compliant

The company has not incorporated this regulation, on a non-mandatory basis, to its internal rules (Social Bylaws), which does not prevent from complying in practice with said Recommendation.

4. Detailed proposals of the resolutions to be adopted at the general shareholders' meeting, including the information stated in recommendation 28, should be made available at the same time as the publication of the meeting notice.

Compliant

5. Separate votes should be taken at the general shareholders' meeting on materially separate items, so shareholders can express their preferences in each case, in order for the shareholders to exercise their voting preferences separately. And that said rule is applied, particularly:

The appointment or ratification of directors, with separate voting on each candidate; Amendments to the bylaws, with votes taken on all Articles or groups of Articles that are materially different.

See section: E.8

Compliant

6. Companies should allow split votes, so financial intermediaries acting as nominees on behalf of different clients can issue their votes according to instructions.

See section: E.4

Compliant

7. The board of directors should perform its duties with unity of purpose and independent judgement, according all shareholders the same treatment. It should be guided at all times by the company's best interest and, as such, strive to maximise its value over time. It should likewise ensure that the company abides by the laws and regulations in its dealings with stakeholders; fulfils its obligations and contracts in good faith; respects the customs and good practices of the sectors and territories where it does business; and upholds any additional social responsibility principles it has subscribed to voluntarily.

Compliant

8. The board should see the core components of its mission as to approve the company's strategy and authorise the organisational resources to carry it forward, and to ensure that management meets the objectives set while pursuing the company's interests and corporate purpose. As such, the board in full should reserve the right to approve:

- a) The company's general policies and strategies, and in particular:
 - i) The strategic or business plan, management targets and annual budgets;
 - ii) Investment and financing policy;
 - iii) Design of the structure of the corporate group;
 - iv) Corporate governance policy;
 - v) Corporate social responsibility policy;
 - vi) Remuneration and evaluation of senior officers;
 - vii) Risk control and management, and the periodic monitoring of internal information and control systems.
 - viii) Dividend policy, as well as the policy and limits applying to treasury stock.

See sections: B.1.10., B.1.13., B.1.14 and D.3

- b) The following decisions:
 - i) On the proposal of the company's chief executive, the appointment and removal of senior officers, and their compensation clauses.

See section: B.1.14

- ii) Directors' remuneration and, in the case of executive directors, the additional consideration for their management duties and other contract conditions.

See section: B.1.14

- iii) The financial information that all listed companies must periodically disclose.
- iv) Investments or operations considered strategic by virtue of their amount or special characteristics, unless their approval corresponds to the general shareholders' meeting;
- v) The creation or acquisition of shares in special purpose vehicles or entities resident in countries or territories considered tax havens, and any other transactions or operations of a comparable nature whose complexity might impair the transparency of the group.

c) Transactions which the company conducts with directors, significant shareholders, shareholders with board representation or other persons related thereto ("related-party transactions").

However, board authorisation need not be required for related-party transactions that simultaneously meet the following three conditions:

- 1st. They are governed by standard form agreements applied on an across-the-board basis to a large number of clients;

2nd. They go through at market rates, generally set by the person supplying the goods or services;
3rd. Their amount is no more than 1% of the company's annual revenues.

It is advisable that related-party transactions should only be approved on the basis of a favourable report from the audit committee or some other committee handling the same function; and that the directors involved should neither exercise nor delegate their votes, and should withdraw from the meeting room while the board deliberates and votes.

Ideally the above powers should not be delegated with the exception of those mentioned in b) and c), which may be delegated to the executive committee in urgent cases and later ratified by the full board.

See sections: C.1 and C.6

Compliant

9. In the interests of maximum effectiveness and participation, the board of directors should ideally comprise no fewer than five and no more than fifteen members.

See section: B.1.1

Compliant

10. External directors, proprietary and independent, should occupy an ample majority of board places, while the number of executive directors should be the minimum practical bearing in mind the complexity of the corporate group and the ownership interests they control.

See sections: A.2., A.3., B.1.3 and B.1.14

Compliant

11. In the event that some external director can be deemed neither proprietary nor independent, the company should disclose this circumstance and the links that person maintains with the company or its senior officers, or its shareholders.

See section: B.1.3

Not applicable

12. That among external directors, the relation between proprietary members and independents should match the proportion between the capital represented on the board by proprietary directors and the remainder of the company's capital.

This proportional criterion can be relaxed so the weight of proprietary directors is greater than would strictly correspond to the total percentage of capital they represent:

1. In large cap companies where few or no equity stakes attain the legal threshold for significant shareholdings, despite the considerable sums actually invested.
2. In companies with a plurality of shareholders represented on the board but not otherwise related.

See sections: B.1.3, A.2 and A.3

Compliant

13. The number of independent directors should represent at least one third of all board members.

See section: B.1.3

Compliant

14. The condition of each director should be explained to the shareholders at general meeting of shareholders, which will make or ratify his or her appointment. Such determination should subsequently be confirmed or reviewed in each year's annual corporate governance report, after verification by the nomination committee. The said report should also disclose the reasons for the appointment of proprietary directors at the urging of

shareholders controlling less than 5% of capital; and explain any rejection of a formal request for a board place from shareholders whose equity stake is equal to or greater than that of others applying successfully for a proprietary directorship.

See sections: B.1.3 and B.1.4

Compliant

15. When women directors are few or non-existent, the board should state the reasons for this situation and the measures taken to correct it; in particular, the Nomination Committee should take steps to ensure that:

The process of filling board vacancies has no implicit bias against women candidates; The company makes a conscious effort to include women with the target profile among the candidates for board places.

See sections: B.1.2, B.1.27 and B.2.3

Compliant

16. The chairman, as the person responsible for the proper operation of the board, should ensure that directors are supplied with sufficient information in advance of board meetings, and work to procure a good level of debate and the active involvement of all members, safeguarding their rights to freely express and adopt positions; he or she should organise and coordinate regular evaluations of the board and, where appropriate, the company's chief executive, along with the chairmen of the relevant board committees.

See section: B.1.42

Compliant

17. When a company's chairman is also its chief executive, an independent director should be empowered to request the calling of board meetings or the inclusion of new business on the agenda; to coordinate and give voice to the concerns of external directors; and to lead the board's evaluation of the chairman.

See section: B.1.21

Explanation

The Board of Directors currently comprises fifteen members. The Regulations of the Board of Directors regulate the composition, functions and internal organization of the governing body. Furthermore, the company has an Internal Code of Conduct in Stock Markets applicable to board members, the senior management and any other employees who may be affected by the terms thereof on account of their post or assigned duties. The Regulations of the General Shareholders' Meeting regulate the formal aspects and internal system for staging shareholders' meetings. Lastly, the Board of Directors is assisted by its Audit Committee and the Appointments and Remuneration Committee, which both have their own respective Internal Regulations. All these rules and regulations are brought together in a consolidated text of the company's Internal Good Governance Rules, which is available from the company's website, www.abengoa.com. Since its inception, the Appointments and Remuneration Committee has been analyzing the structure of the company's governing bodies and has been working to adapt it to incorporate corporate governance recommendations, paying particular attention to the historic and special configuration of these bodies within Abengoa. In accordance with this analysis, in February 2007 the Committee recommended the creation of the post of coordinating director, coupled with the elimination of the Advisory Committee to the Board of Directors. The first measure was in order to incorporate the most recent corporate governance recommendations, as created in Spain in 2006, whereas the second was proposed because the Committee considered that the Advisory Committee had already fulfilled the function for which it was originally created and that its coexistence with the corporate bodies could lead to conflicts of power. Both proposals were approved at a meeting of the Board of Directors held in February 2007 and

at the General Shareholders' Meeting held on April 15 of the same year appointing Mr. José B. Terceiro in representation of Aplicaciones Digitales S.L., as coordinating director, acting as independent, up to date.

On a final note, in October 2007 the Committee proposed to the Board that it accept the resignation of Mr. Javier Benjumea Llórente from his position as Vice-Chairman, with the consequent revocation of his delegated powers, and likewise accept the appointment of a new natural person to represent Abengoa and the Focus-Abengoa Foundation in those entities or companies in which they have an appointed position.

The Committee then considered it advisable to recommence its study on the number and characteristics of the Vice-Chairman of the Board of Directors within the current structure of governing bodies.

As a result of this, the Committee thought it necessary for the Vice-Chairman of Abengoa to have the powers conferred by the Spanish Public Limited Companies Act (Ley de Sociedades Anónimas) with regard to the organic representation of the company on the one hand, and, on the other, as a counterweight to the functions of the Chairman within the Board of Directors. On this basis, it considered that the coordinating director – with the functions assigned to that position by the resolutions of the Board of Directors (February 2007) and the General Shareholders' Meeting (April 2007) – was the ideal figure, given the corporate governance recommendations and the structure of the company, as well as the composition and diversity of its directors. The coordinating director has already been entrusted with the task of coordinating the concerns and motivations of the other Board members, and as such has the power to request that a Board meeting be convened and that new items be included on the agenda. In its role as the visible head of Board members' interests, it has, more de facto than de jure, a certain representative nature on the Board, and it therefore seemed appropriate to confirm and expand this representation by making the post both institutional and organic.

For the reasons outlined above, the Committee proposed Aplicaciones Digitales, S.L. (Aplidig, represented by Mr José B. Terceiro Lomba), the current coordinating director, as the new Vice-Chairman to the Board of Directors. In addition, and within the functions of organic representation, the current Vice-Chairman, jointly with the Chairman of the Board, was put forward as the physical representative of Abengoa in its capacity as the Chair of the Focus-Abengoa Foundation, as well as in any other foundations and institutions in which the company is or must be represented.

In view of the above, on December 10, 2007, the Board of Directors agreed to appoint Aplicaciones Digitales, S.L. (represented by Mr José B. Terceiro Lomba), the current coordinating director, as executive deputy Chairman of the Board of Directors, with the unanimous consent of the independent directors for the company to continue acting as coordinating director in spite of its new appointment as executive deputy Chairman.

In addition, and within the functions of organic representation (conferred by means of a power of attorney granted by the Board of Directors on July 23, 2007), the Vice-Chairman, jointly with the Chairman of the Board of Directors, has been put forward as the physical representative of Abengoa, in its capacity as the Chair of the Board of the Focus-Abengoa Foundation, as well as in any other foundations and institutions in which the company is or must be represented.

18. The secretary should take care to ensure that the board's actions:

- a) Adhere to the spirit and letter of laws and their implementing regulations, including those issued by regulatory agencies;
- b) Comply with the company bylaws and the regulations of the general shareholders' meeting, the board of directors and others;
- c) Are informed by those good governance recommendations of the Unified Code that the company has subscribed to.

In order to safeguard the independence, impartiality and professionalism of the secretary,

his or her appointment and removal should be proposed by the nomination committee and approved by a full board meeting; the relevant appointment and removal procedures being spelled out in the board's regulation.

See section: B.1.34

Compliant

19. The board should meet with the necessary frequency to properly perform its functions, in accordance with a calendar and agendas set at the beginning of the year, to which each director may propose the addition of other items.

See section: B.1.29

Compliant

20. Director absences should be kept to the bare minimum and quantified in the annual corporate governance report. When directors have no choice but to delegate their vote, they should do so with instructions.

See sections: B.1.28 and B.1.30

Compliant

21. When directors or the secretary express concerns about some proposal or, in the case of directors, about the company's performance, and such concerns are not resolved at the meeting, the person expressing them can request that they be recorded in the minute book.

Compliant

22. The board in full should evaluate the following points on a yearly basis:

The quality and efficiency of the board's operation;
Starting from a report submitted by the nomination committee, how well the chairman and chief executive have carried out their duties;
The performance of its committees on the basis of the reports furnished by the same.

See section: B.1.19

Compliant

23. All directors should be able to exercise their right to receive any additional information they require on matters within the board's competence. Unless the bylaws or board regulations indicate otherwise, such requests should be addressed to the chairman or secretary.

See section: B.1.42

Compliant

24. All directors should be entitled to call on the company for the advice and guidance they need to carry out their duties. The company should provide suitable channels for the exercise of this right, extending in special circumstances to external assistance at the company's expense.

See section: B.1.41

Compliant

25. Companies should set up orientation programs that may provide new board members with quick and sufficient knowledge of the company and its corporate governance rules and regulations. Companies should make knowledge updating programs available to board members whenever the circumstances deem it advisable.

Compliant

26. Companies should require their directors to devote sufficient time and effort to perform their duties effectively, and, as such:

- a) Directors should apprise the Nomination Committee of any other professional obligations, in case they might detract from the necessary dedication;
- b) Companies should lay down rules about the number of directorships their board members can hold.

See sections: B.1.8, B.1.9 and B.1.17

Partially compliant

Section (a) of this recommendation is complied with, in that the Appointments and Remuneration Committee is kept duly informed of the professional duties of Board members, as well as their potential needs with regard to any information they may need to exercise them. In relation to section (b), there are no limits on participation on other Boards, and this aspect is left to the responsible judgement of each director.

27. The proposal for the appointment or renewal of directors which the board submits to the general shareholders' meeting, as well as provisional appointments by the method of co-optation, should be approved by the board:

- a) On the proposal of the nomination committee, in the case of independent directors.
- b) Subject to a report from the nomination committee in all other cases.

See section: B.1.2

Compliant

28. Companies should post the following director particulars on their websites, and keep them permanently updated:

- a) Professional experience and background;
- b) Directorships held in other companies, listed or otherwise;
- c) An indication of the director's classification as executive, proprietary or independent; in the case of proprietary directors, stating the shareholder they represent or have links with.
- d) The date of their first and subsequent appointments as a company director, and;
- e) Shares held in the company and any options on the same.

Compliant

29. Independent directors should not stay on as such for a continuous period of more than 12 years.

See section: B.1.2

Compliant

30. Proprietary directors should resign when the shareholders they represent dispose of their ownership interest in its entirety. If such shareholders reduce their stakes, thereby losing some of their entitlement to proprietary directors, the latter's number should be reduced accordingly.

See sections: A.2., A.3 and B.1.2

Compliant

31. The board of directors should not propose the removal of independent directors before the expiry of their tenure as mandated by the bylaws, except where just cause is found by the board, based on a proposal from the Nomination Committee. In particular, just cause will be presumed when a director is in breach of his or her fiduciary duties or comes under one of the disqualifying grounds enumerated in section III.5 (Definitions) of this Code.

The removal of independents may also be proposed when a takeover bid, merger or similar corporate operation produces changes in the company's capital structure, in order to meet the proportionality criterion set out in recommendation 12.

See sections: B.1.2, B.1.5 and B.1.26

Compliant

32. Companies should establish rules obliging directors to inform the board of any circumstance that might harm the organisation's name or reputation, tendering their resignation as the case may be, with particular mention of any criminal charges brought against them and the progress of any subsequent trial.

The moment a director is indicted or tried for any of the crimes stated in Article 124 of the Spanish Companies Act (Ley de Sociedades Anónimas), the board should examine the matter and, in view of the particular circumstances and potential harm to the company's name and reputation, decide whether or not he or she should be called on to resign. The board should also disclose all such determinations in the annual corporate governance report.

See sections: B.1.43 and B.1.44

Compliant

33. All directors should express clear opposition when they feel a proposal submitted for the board's approval might damage the corporate interest. In particular, independents and other directors unaffected by the conflict of interest should challenge any decision that could go against the interests of shareholders lacking board representation.

When the board makes material or reiterated decisions about which a director has expressed serious reservations, then he or she must draw the pertinent conclusions. Directors resigning for such causes should set out their reasons in the letter referred to in the next recommendation. The terms of this recommendation should also apply to the secretary of the board; director or otherwise.

Compliant

34. Directors who give up their position before their tenure expires, through resignation or otherwise, should state their reasons in a letter to be sent to all members of the board. Irrespective of whether such resignation is filed as a significant event, the motive for the same must be explained in the annual corporate governance report.

See section: B.1.5

Compliant

35. The company's remuneration policy, as approved by its board of directors, should specify at least the following points:

- a) The amount of the fixed components, itemised where necessary, of board and board committee attendance fees, with an estimate of the fixed annual payment they give rise to;
- b) Variable components, in particular:
 - i) The types of directors they apply to, with an explanation of the relative weight of variable to fixed remuneration items.
 - ii) Performance evaluation criteria used to calculate entitlement to the award of shares or share options or any performance-related remuneration;

- iii) The main parameters and grounds for any system of annual bonuses or other, non cash benefits; and
- iv) An estimate of the sum total of variable payments arising from the remuneration policy proposed, as a function of degree of compliance with pre-set targets or benchmarks.

c) The main characteristics of pension systems (for example, supplementary pensions, life insurance and similar arrangements), with an estimate of their amount of annual equivalent cost.

d) The conditions to apply to the contracts of executive directors exercising senior management functions, among them:

- i) Duration;
- ii) Notice periods; and
- iii) Any other clauses covering hiring bonuses, as well as indemnities or 'golden parachutes' in the event of early termination of the contractual relation between company and executive director.

See section: B.1.15

Compliant

36. Remuneration comprising the delivery of shares in the company or other companies in the group, share options or other share-based instruments, payments linked to the company's performance or membership of pension schemes should be confined to executive directors.

The delivery of shares is excluded from this limitation when directors are obliged to retain them until the end of their tenure.

See sections: A.3 and B.1.3

Compliant

37. External directors' remuneration should sufficiently compensate them for the dedication, abilities and responsibilities that the post entails, but should not be so high as to compromise their independence.

Compliant

38. In the case of remuneration linked to company earnings, deductions should be computed for any qualifications stated in the external auditor's report.

Compliant

39. In the case of variable awards, remuneration policies should include technical safeguards to ensure they reflect the professional performance of the beneficiaries and not simply the general progress of the markets or the company's sector, atypical or exceptional transactions or circumstances of this kind.

Compliant

40. The Board should submit a report on the directors' remuneration policy to the advisory vote of the general shareholders' meeting, as a separate point on the agenda. This report can be supplied to shareholders separately or in the manner each company sees fit.

The report will focus on the remuneration policy the board has approved for the current year with reference, as the case may be, to the policy planned for future years. It will address all the points referred to in recommendation 35, except those potentially entailing the disclosure of commercially sensitive information. It will also identify and explain the most significant changes in remuneration policy with respect to the previous year, with a global summary of how the policy was applied over the period in question.

The role of the remuneration committee in designing the policy should be reported to the meeting, along with the identity of any external advisors engaged.

See section: B.1.16

Compliant

41. The notes to the annual accounts should list individual directors' remuneration in the year, including:

- a) A breakdown of the compensation obtained by each company director, to include where appropriate:
 - i) Participation and attendance fees and other fixed director payments;
 - ii) Additional compensation for acting as chairman or member of a board committee;
 - iii) Any payments made under profit-sharing or bonus schemes, and the reason for their accrual;
 - iv) Contributions on the director's behalf to defined-contribution pension plans, or any increase in the director's vested rights in the case of contributions to defined-benefit schemes;
 - v) Any severance packages agreed or paid;
 - vi) Any compensation they receive as directors of other companies in the group;
 - vii) The remuneration executive directors receive in respect of their senior management posts;
 - viii) Any kind of compensation other than those listed above, of whatever nature and provenance within the group, especially when it may be accounted a related-party transaction or when its omission would detract from a true and fair view of the total remuneration received by the director.
- b) An individual breakdown of deliveries to directors of shares, share options or other share-based instruments, itemised by:
 - i) Number of shares or options awarded in the year, and the terms set for their execution;
 - ii) Number of options exercised in the year, specifying the number of shares involved and the exercise price;
 - iii) Number of options outstanding at the annual close, specifying their price, date and other exercise conditions;
 - iv) Any change in the year in the exercise terms of previously awarded options.
- c) Information on the relation in the year between the remuneration obtained by executive directors and the company's profits, or some other measure of enterprise results.

Compliant

42. When the company has an executive committee, the breakdown of its members by director category should be similar to that of the board itself. The secretary of the board should also act as secretary to the executive committee.

See sections: B.2.1 and B.2.6

Not applicable

43. The board should be kept fully informed of the business transacted and decisions made by the executive committee. To this end, all board members should receive a copy of the committee's minutes.

Not applicable

44. In addition to the audit committee mandatory under the Securities Market Act (Ley del Mercado de Valores), the board of directors should form a committee, or two separate committees, of nomination and remuneration.